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Abstract 
When the global financial crisis erupted in the United States in the fall of 
2008, the Chinese economy was seen to be relatively immune. However, this 
optimism proved misplaced. The contagion quickly spread to China, albeit, 
the overall impact was moderate – at least when compared to many other 
advanced and emerging market economies. How and why was China impacted 
by the financial crisis? In particular, what were the “transmission channels” 
via which the contagion spread into the Chinese economy? How has Beijing 
responded to the economic and sociopolitical challenges unleashed by the 
crisis, and how effective have been their responses been? Furthermore, what 
must Beijing do over the long-term to rebalance its economy and make it 
less vulnerable to domestic and external shocks? This paper addresses these 
interrelated issues.
Keywords: global financial crisis, Chinese economy, economic rebalancing, 
stimulus
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1. Introduction1
Even as the global economy was gripped in the throes of a spiraling financial 
crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, China 
was among a handful of economies that conspicuously remained an outlier. 
Not only was the Chinese economy booming – notching an impressive 9.3 
per cent growth in GDP in 2008, Beijing’s top priority was to dampen the 
inflationary pressures and prevent the economy from overheating. To many 
analysts, such starkly divergent trajectories reflected by the world’s largest and 
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second largest economy could be explained by a single fact: that the Chinese 
economy had tangibly “decoupled” from the American economy. More 
specifically, the China-centered trade integration in Asia and the massive 
ability within China’s economy to generate a domestically driven demand 
meant that the Chinese economy had become decoupled or that its business 
cycle had become less synchronized with that of the advanced economies, 
notably the United States and Western Europe.2 Predictably, this led observers 
to conclude that China was immune from an economic slowdown emanating 
from the US and Europe. 
To others, China’s immunity was due to the “cushion” Beijing enjoyed 
because of its substantial foreign exchange reserves. Beijing’s holdings of 
US Treasury debt skyrocketed from about US$46 billion in 1998 to US$587 
billion by 2008.3 According to the US Treasury, China’s investment in 
Treasury bonds totaled some US$585 billion in September 2008, compared to 
Japan, which held US$573.2 billion worth (Table 1). Moreover, in mid-2008, 
Beijing held the world’s largest cash reserve of roughly US$2 trillion.4 This 
was not counting an additional US$800 billion as Beijing also purchases US 
debt through third countries which are not recorded by the Treasury as being 
held by China. This meant that on the eve of the crisis China owned US$1 
out of every US$10 in US public debt. This made Beijing the largest foreign 
Table 1 Foreign Holders of US Treasury Securities (September 2008)
 US$ billion Per cent of Debt Held 
  by the Public
China 587.0 10.1
Japan 573.2 9.8
United Kingdom 338.3 5.8
Caribbean Banking Centersa 185.3 3.2
Oil Exportersb 182.1 3.1
Brazil 141.9 2.4
All Other 852.9 14.6
Total 2,860.7 49.0
Notes: a  Caribbean banking centers include Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, 
Netherlands Antilles, Panama and British Virgin Islands. 
 b  Oil exporters include Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, 
Gabon, Libya and Nigeria.
Source:  US Treasury. 2009. Treasury Bulletin, Table OFS-1.
IJCS 3-2 combined text 31-08-12.116   116 8/31/2012   1:03:12 PM
Chinese Economy in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis      117
holder of US government debt – indeed, the US government’s leading foreign 
creditor – and the world’s leading creditor nation, while the United States 
became the world’s largest debtor. 
Rather ironically, if earlier, vilified for creating the “global savings glut” 
seen as responsible for the crash of 2008, Beijing’s formidable reserves were 
now seen as a source of much needed global liquidity in an increasingly 
capital scarce world.5 Not surprisingly, it was suggested that the well-
endowed and booming Chinese economy could serve as a potential “shock 
absorber” and “locomotive” to help drive the global economy out of its deep 
malaise (Dobson, 2009). 
Others were upbeat because China (like the other major Asian economies, 
namely, Japan, India and South Korea) had only modest exposure to the 
“toxic” subprime loans and structured credit products originating in the United 
States as the Chinese financial sector does not trade much in derivatives 
(Lardy, 2010). The claim by the People’s Bank of China (PBC, the country’s 
central bank) that none of its massive US$2 trillion foreign reserves was 
invested in subprime debt was just a slight exaggeration as it is well known 
that a large percentage of China’s reserves are invested in long-term US 
securities. It is estimated that the Bank of China held about US$8.9 billion of 
securities backed by US subprime loans, while the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China and China Construction Bank reported exposure was about 
US$2 billion each (Caijing, 2009; also Lee and Park, 2009: 17). Suffice it to 
note, these are extremely small debts. That is, even if the three Chinese banks 
exposure to risky subprime assets totaled US$12.9 billion it was still a mere 6 
per cent of the US$199 billion in private foreign securities they held. 
Furthermore, since China’s banks rely extensively on deposits rather 
than wholesale funding and fund their loans through deposits rather than 
capital markets they were better insulated from the global credit crunch 
than Western banks – indeed, banks in much of the world.6 Beijing’s limited 
reliance on foreign capital to finance growth gave it further shield, and 
the country’s corporate and banking sector balance sheets were relatively 
robust.7 The ambitious and wide-ranging banking reforms of early 2000, 
which included bank recapitalization, the strengthening of corporate and 
supervision, and greater compliance with international best practices, had 
not only helped remove a large portion of the nonperforming loans of 
the banking sector (Table 2), but also led to higher risk-weighted capital 
adequacy ratios.8
This made China’s once moribund banking system more solvent. 
Indeed, the major banks capital positions were strong on the eve of the 
crisis (Kwong, 2011; Riedel, Jin and Gao, 2007), and this explains why no 
financial institutions failed during the height of the crisis in 2008-09 (Woo 
and Zhang, 2011). 
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Equally important, China’s low budget deficits, modest level of public 
debt (about 18 per cent of GDP in 2007 to nearly 40 per cent for the United 
States), and a largely closed capital account served as critical buffers to 
external shocks. More specifically, it not only meant that the spillover effects 
into the Chinese economy would be minimal, but also easier to contain. 
Although, it was well-known that Beijing had a potentially risky housing 
bubble problem, it was also felt that China’s banks were far better prepared 
to withstand falling house prices than their American counterparts because 
Chinese buyers (unlike their American counterparts) are required to put down 
a minimum deposit of 20 to 30 per cent down-payment and as much as 40 per 
cent on second homes. 
Also, rather counter-intuitively, although the Chinese economy has 
become deeply enmeshed into the global economy, it is still not fully 
integrated into the global financial system (Yao and Wu, 2011). In particular, 
China is still a minor player in the global financial system. For example, 
Chinese banks, some of which are large by global standards based on 
market capitalization and the size of their balance sheets, have only modest 
international presence. Furthermore, the RMB (or the renminbi9) denominated 
debt-market is shallow and the Chinese currency plays a relatively minor 
role in the global foreign exchange market. In fact, the RMB is hardly used 
outside China, except for a modest amount in Hong Kong, and Chinese capital 
markets are not a major source of financing for foreign borrowers. Overall, 
China’s capital markets is small relative to the size of the domestic economy, 
and relies heavily on FDI rather than securities investment and other forms 
Table 2 Nonperforming Loans (% of commercial bank loans)
 1998  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007*
China***  28.5**  17.8  13.2  8.6  7.1  6.2
Hong Kong**** 5.3  3.9  2.3  1.4  1.1  0.9
Germany  3.0  5.2  4.9  4.0  3.4  n/a
Japan  5.4 5.2  2.9  1.8  1.5  1.5
United States 1.0  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.8  1.1
Notes: * Data for Hong Kong, China; Rep. of Korea; Japan, Singapore, and the 
United States as of September 2007.
 ** Figure refers to 1999 data.
 *** 1999–2001 data are for state-owned commercial banks only.
 **** Reported nonperforming loans are gross classified loan ratio of retail 
banks.
Source:  Lee and Park (2009: 19).
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of capital flows to access international capital markets.10 Although there has 
been gradual liberalization, Beijing continues to heavily regulate many cross-
border transactions and subjects portfolio capital flows to various restrictions. 
Namely, a cautious approach to financial sector liberalization has meant that 
portfolio flows are still largely channeled through large institutional investors 
via the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) and QDII (Qualified 
Domestic Institutional Investors) programs established in 2002. The QFII 
program is restricted to funds-management and securities companies with 
at least US$10 billion in assets, including the world’s top 100 commercial 
banks. In addition, securities regulator of the QFII’s home country must sign 
a “Memorandum of Understanding” and have a track-record of good relations 
with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), while the QDII’s 
must have assets of over five billion RMB.11
Finally, since the crisis was seen as related to factors specific to the US 
economy, especially problems associated with expansionary monetary policy 
that had kept US interest rates low for some years and led to a real estate 
bubble (rather than to systemic factors such as an oil shock or adverse trade 
relations), it was believed that the economic fallout would be mainly limited 
to the United States and that American authorities would, in short order, 
contain the crisis. 
2. The Contagion Hits
However, China did not remain immune long – albeit, it has fared far better 
than most. In early December 2008, the RMB experienced its largest weekly 
decline against the US dollar since July 2005 (when the RMB’s peg to the 
dollar was lifted), and China’s foreign exchange notched a modest decline 
largely through valuation changes. It is important to note that the contagion 
caused a slowdown in China’s economic growth – the Chinese economy never 
actually contracted. China’s quarterly growth rate in 2008 was 10.6 per cent, 
10 per cent, 9 per cent and 6.8 per cent – with an overall average of 9.3 per 
cent. Nevertheless, given its perceived immunity, how and why was China 
impacted? In particular, what were the “transmission channels” via which the 
contagion spread into the Chinese economy? How did Beijing respond to the 
economic and sociopolitical challenges unleashed by the crisis, how effective 
have been the response been, and what was Beijing do over the long-term to 
rebalance its economy and make it less vulnerable to external shocks?
At the outset it should be noted that contagion stemming from a financial 
crisis can be transmitted simultaneously via several channels – both broad and 
specific. Broadly, the rapid global spread of the crisis unambiguously under-
scores that in today’s interconnected world no country is an island. Closely 
integrated financial and banking systems and deepening trade interdependence 
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has meant that even countries not directly exposed to the toxic subprime assets 
originating from the United States are extremely vulnerable to the financial 
contagion. This is in part because economic globalization not only creates 
deep and entwining linkages between economies, but also “convergence” 
amongst them. As such, troubles in one part, especially the largest part (the 
United States) will inevitably send waves which may become ripples in some 
places (China) and a tsunami in other places (Iceland). 
Furthermore, global economic integration has generated unprecedented 
levels of capital flows. These funds now cross national borders, often at will, 
despite attempts by governments to control and regulate its movement. Such 
financially integrated markets also mean more rapid and powerful spillover 
across economies through both traditional and newer types of channels. For 
example, although spillovers through the traditional trade channel remains 
a central transmission mechanism (even though global trade patterns have 
become more diversified), financial spillovers have become more pronounced 
as the rising correlation of global equity prices and the potential for sudden 
capital flow reversals mean that shocks at the core can be transmitted 
rapidly throughout the entire global financial system. For example, China’s 
stock markets are particularly vulnerable to swings in investor sentiment. 
Heightened anxiety over growing losses led foreign institutional investors 
(FIIs) to sell billions of their investment in Chinese companies to cover losses 
accrued in their home markets. As a result the Stock Exchanges took a beating 
– with the Shanghai stock market falling by 48 per cent between May and 
November 2008 (De Haan, 2010: 761).
Decoupling did not mean that a downturn in the American economy 
would have no impact on emerging market economies like China. Rather, 
a more nuanced version of the decoupling thesis – such as those articulated 
by the IMF did distinguish between the “effects” of a “moderate” slowdown 
in the United States to a “sharp slowdown or recession” (Akin and Kose, 
2007; IMF, 2007). Specifically, “… most countries should be in a position 
to ‘decouple’ from the US economy and sustain strong growth if the US 
slowdown remains as moderate as expected, although countries with strong 
trade linkages with the United States in specific sectors may experience some 
drag on their growth. However, if the US economy experienced a sharper 
slowdown because of a broader-than-expected impact of the housing sector 
difficulties, the spillover effects into other economies would be larger, and 
decoupling would be more difficult” (IMF, 2007). As the crisis only became 
more severe – especially, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers – decoupling 
no longer guaranteed immunity. 
Finally, as is well known, China’s integration into the global economy 
exemplified by its export-led growth strategy has proven to be remarkably 
successful producing an unprecedented 10 per cent annual growth for the 
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past three decades (Lin, 2012). During this period, China has seen its share 
of world GDP rise to 13 per cent (in 2010) from less than 2 per cent in 1980 
– even as its share of the world’s population declined to 20 per cent from 25 
per cent. Equally impressive, with real GDP per head increasing almost thirty-
fold, hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of abject poverty. On 
the eve of the reforms in 1978, the incidence of poverty in China was among 
the highest in the world. However, over the past three decades the proportion 
of people living in extreme poverty fell from some 53 per cent to below 5 per 
cent. This means that across China there were over 500 million fewer people 
living in extreme poverty than in 1978 (IMF, 2010; Lin, Cai and Li, 2003; 
World Bank, 2009). Few countries have grown so fast over such an extended 
period of time or reduced the incidence of poverty so sharply. However, with 
the onset of the crisis, China’s heavy dependence on exports of goods and 
services now became a liability. 
As Table 3 shows, China’s exports of goods and services as a share of 
GDP rose sharply from 9.1 per cent in 1985 to 37.8 per cent in 2008. 
Table 3 China’s Exports of Goods and Services (as % of GDP)
Year Percentage of Exports
1985  9.1
1990  14.2
1995  19.5
2000  23.4
2005  36.5
2008  37.8
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
In fact, in 2007, China not only replaced the United States to become 
the world’s second largest exporter of merchandise goods (after the EU), 
its net exports (exports minus imports) contributed to a whopping one-
third of its overall GDP growth in 2007. Most of the export industries were 
direct beneficiaries of foreign direct investment (FDI) which totaled some 
US$92.4 billion in 2008 – making China the third largest recipient of FDI 
after the EU and the United States (Xing, 2010). Also, according to Chinese 
government estimates, in 2007 over 80 million people depended on the 
“foreign trade sector” for employment – with some 28 million employed 
directly in enterprises engaged in exports. Therefore, on one hand, rapid 
and unprecedented changes in the structure of the Chinese economy have 
generated sustained economic growth, on the other, it has made growth highly 
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depended on the continuation of robust external trade and external capital 
flows (Arora and Cardarelli, 2011). This also meant that a global slowdown 
in demand would rapidly translate into a corresponding negative impact on 
economic growth. 
As the United States, the EU and the Middle East account for a significant 
portion of China’s exports, the sharp deterioration in demand with the onset 
of the financial crisis saw the value of China’s exports fall by 16.7 per cent 
between October 2008 and November 2009 (IMF, 2010; OECD, 2010). 
According to a World Bank study, “since the onset of the crisis, exports shifted 
from 20 per cent annual growth to an annualized contraction of more than 25 
per cent in early 2009” (Vincelette, 2010: 13). The most severely impacted 
have been the technology and capital-intensive exports, forcing several 
companies (both domestic and foreign) in these key sectors to shut down their 
factories and businesses. Such sharp export contraction also led to equally 
sharp declines in FDI – which “plunged to -35.52% in November 2008. The 
period of negative FDI growth lasted for nine months until September 2009” 
(Woo and Zhang, 2010: 354). 
Cumulatively, these had a deleterious impact of the highly export-
dependent Chinese economy. Indeed, with demand for Chinese exports 
evaporating some “67,000 small and medium-sized companies across China 
were forced to shut down in 2008” (Yang and Lim, 2010: 27). In Guangdong 
province some 6.7 million jobs were lost (De Haan, 2010: 763), and in 
China’s key industrial provinces an estimated “20 million workers lost their 
jobs” (Overholt, 2010: 28). In addition, as many as 26 million of China’s 
estimated 130 million migrant workers were left unemployed (Tan and Xin, 
2009). No doubt, the authorities are cognizant of the fact that after years of 
double-digit growth anything less than at least 8 per cent a year growth could 
lead to further unemployment and social tensions. Indeed, Overholt (2010: 
28) notes that “the loss of tens of millions of jobs supplemented another 
domestic trend, namely the rapid rise over the years in the number of the 
so-called ‘mass incidents’, or popular demonstrations. According to official 
statistics, these had risen from 8,700 in 1993 to about 40,000 in the year 2000, 
compounded by increasing size, violence, and effectiveness of the protests, 
with a further rise to 74,000 in 2004. Official statistics do not yet reveal the 
scale of the additional impact of the financial crisis, but there have been many 
widely publicized protests by workers losing their jobs.” 
3. Beijing’s Ambitious Response
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 which saw an abrupt and sharp 
shrinkage in external demand, the rise of protectionism in the advanced 
economies, and growing chorus of criticism of China’s economic policies 
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from American lawmakers in both houses of Congress and the White House, 
only underscored what Beijing, itself, had come to recognize: that excessive 
dependence on exports was not a sustainable long-term strategy. That is, 
China’s investment-driven and export-oriented development model, with 
exports accounting for 40 per cent of GDP, was becoming increasingly 
difficult to sustain (Morrison and Labonte, 2008). In fact, Lardy (2006: 1) 
points out that Chinese authorities have been increasingly concerned about 
the country’s economic trajectory and as early as 2004 “China’s top political 
leadership agreed to fundamentally alter the country’s growth strategy by 
rebalancing the sources of economic growth”.
This is because China has developed two forms of macroeconomic 
imbalances: a “domestic imbalance” due to high-investment (hence, 
“investment-led growth”), and very low household consumption, and an 
“external imbalance,” due to the country’s export-led development strategy 
that relies heavily on exchange rate undervaluation and intervention in the 
foreign exchange rate markets to promote exports (Figures 1 and 2). The 
domestic imbalance has resulted in rapid and massive capital accumulation, 
imbalances between expenditure and production, and the overall income gains 
Figure 1 Consumption and Investment in China (as % of nominal GDP)
Source: Fukumoto and Muto (2011: 4).  
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not percolating to the Chinese people in line with the growth in the country’s 
GDP.12 On the other hand, the external imbalance has generated a massive 
surplus in the current account of the balance of payments. 
Premier Wen Jiabao, a strong proponent of macroeconomic rebalancing 
repeats the imperatives of rebalancing at every opportunity. At the influential 
National People’s Congress in March 2007, Wen noted that “the biggest 
problem with China’s economy is that the growth is unstable, unbalanced, 
uncoordinated and unsustainable.” Again, in a keynote speech to the 
National People’s Congress in March 2010, Wen unambiguously noted 
that a development strategy based on investments to facilitate exports 
cannot be sustained indefinitely. Rather, he pointed out that “unleashing 
domestic demand holds the key to long-term and steady development of 
China’s economy.” Wen noted that “expanding domestic demand is a … 
basic standpoint of China’s economic development as well as a fundamental 
means and an internal requirement for promoting balanced economic 
development.”13 In other words, a transition or rebalancing away from exports 
and investment-driven growth towards “consumption-driven growth” was 
declared to essential to the long-term dynamism of the Chinese economy. 
Figure 2 Per Capita GDP and Per Capita Disposable Income in China
Source: Fukumoto and Muto (2011: 5).
 
IJCS 3-2 combined text 31-08-12.124   124 8/31/2012   1:03:12 PM
Chinese Economy in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis      125
To guide this transition, or in Wen words, “put China’s economy quickly on 
the path of endogenous growth,” he pledged billions of renminbi would be 
invested in “human and social services” – especially, affordable housing, 
expanding educational opportunities and delivering a more comprehensive 
health and social welfare system. 
Beijing – which had maintained a contractionary fiscal policy from 
2001-0714 now found itself in a good fiscal position (the fiscal balance as 
percentage of GDP in early 2008 was 0.7 and the debt-to-GDP ratio was only 
20 per cent), to stimulate the economy (IMF, 2008: 46; World Bank, 2009). 
Coupled with this, Beijing’s formidable “war-chest” of cash reserves totaling 
more than US$2 trillion gave it unprecedented policy flexibility – especially, 
in the area of fiscal policy by giving it the ability to boost the economy if it 
began to slow down.15 As the strong headwinds emanating from the global 
contagion began to make its deleterious impact felt, Beijing did precisely 
this. On 11 November, 2008, the authorities announced a massive 4 trillion 
RMB (US$586 billion) “duiying guoji jinrong jingji weiji de yilanzi jihua 对
应国际金融经济危机的一揽子计划” or “investment plan” to be spent over 
two years “to counter the negative effects of global financial crisis” (Table 
4). Totaling some 14 per cent of China’s GDP in 2008, it was arguably the 
biggest peacetime stimulus ever. 
As Table 4 shows the stimulus package targeted seven core spending 
areas. General infrastructure included construction and expansion projects 
of high-speed railways, new expressways and highways, airports, city 
subways and nuclear power plants. Through targeted social spending the 
Table 4 China’s Stimulus Package (Total: RMB 4 trillion) 
Infrastructure  2.87
  General infrastructure  1.50
  Reconstruction of Sichuan earthquake area  1.00
  Rural area infrastructure  0.37
Technology and environment  0.58
  Technology and structural adjustment  0.37
  Energy savings and emission reductions  0.21
Social measures  0.55
  Construction and renovation cheap houses  0.40
  Social security and health  0.15
Source:  National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, 2009). <http://
www.ndrc.gov.cn>.
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authorities hoped to increase investment in the public health care system, 
education and subsidized housing, as well as to raise unemployment and other 
welfare benefits. To generate employment, the authorities announced plans 
to reform the value-added taxes (VAT), including increasing VAT rebates 
for export industries, and replacing other cumbersome taxation by a more 
simple corporate income tax.16 The stimulus funds could be made available 
almost immediately, because as Woo and Zhang (2011: 679) note, unlike 
the United States or the UK, where the expansion of the monetary base was 
used to repair the “balance sheets of commercial banks … the expansion of 
the monetary base in China replaced export demand and externally financed 
investment demand with internally generated demand.” Hence, Naughton 
(2009: 278) notes, “disbursement began almost immediately. The Chinese 
government and Communist Party sent an emergency directive to government 
departments at all levels, emphasizing the need to prop up domestic demand 
and start new construction projects. Literally within weeks, local governments 
throughout China were meeting to compile lists of shovel-ready projects that 
compiled with central government directives. As a result, resources began 
flowing through the pipeline by the end of 2008, and expanded government 
investment began to have a discernible impact on the economy during the 
first quarter of 2009”.
However, to many observers, Beijing’s expectations for its massive 
stimulus to generate a much-needed domestic consumption, and thereby 
rebalance the economy unduly skewed towards exports, was puzzling as 
“social measures” represented a mere 5 per cent of the package. This was 
correctly viewed as simply insufficient to stimulate domestic consumption. 
Moreover, the stimulus package was seen as contradictory in that it subsidized 
exports and targeted infrastructure despite the fact that China already has 
overcapacity in industrial production and infrastructure (De Haan, 2010; 
McKissack and Xu, 2011). Given this, the concern was that the multiplier 
effects of the stimulus would be much lower than expected. Indeed, it was 
suggested that a more prudent way to stimulate domestic consumption would 
have been send tax rebates directly to mid-and low-income families as these 
rebates would produce faster and targeted results. Equally perplexing, the 
stimulus package did little to improve the social safety net – which stands at 
less than 1 per cent of GDP. Chinese citizens are prodigious savers because 
they are justly concerned about the prohibitively high medical, education 
and housing costs and lack of social security and other safety-nets when they 
retire. This is particularly true for poorer households who try their best to save 
because they fear the consequences of serious illness, unemployment and old 
age in a country lacking effective government safety nets.17 
In order to discourage precautionary savings and boost consumption, 
on January 21, 2009, Beijing announced additional spending of some 
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RMB850 billion over three years. This was designed to improve health 
care provision by initially covering some 200 million uninsured citizens 
with the goal of achieving universal coverage by 2020, and improving 
access to primary health care in underserviced areas. Also, beginning in 
February 2009, a pension plan for rural workers was initiated and the level 
of pensions to the elderly poor modestly increased. To encourage spending 
by rural households, the authorities’ unveiled the “household appliances 
going to the countryside” (jiadian xiaxiang 家电下乡) and “exchanging 
old for new” (yi jiu huan xin 以旧换新). Under these initiatives, rural 
residents would receive subsidies and rebates on purchases of goods such 
as refrigerators, TVs and washing machines for four years. Furthermore, to 
help the struggling property sector, minimum down-payments was reduced 
from 30-40 per cent of a home’s value to 20 per cent and the transaction 
tax waived for properties held for at least two years. The 12th Five Year 
Plan (2011-16), further committed to construct 36 million low-income 
housing units by 2016. However, a recent IMF study (Ahuja et al., 2012: 
12), notes that “there are few signs in the data that the initiatives to build 
out the social safety net and increase the provision of social housing have 
led precautionary savings to decline or have created sufficient momentum 
for household consumption to reverse the secular decline as a share of GDP 
that has been seen over the past several years.”
Arguably, without effective privatization of state and collective-owned 
land and state assets the stimulus efforts may be a one-time boost only. As 
noted, spending by Chinese households as a percentage of GDP remains 
significantly below private spending levels in other emerging economies. 
However, China’s private consumption has failed to grow, not because 
Chinese consumers do not like to purchase goods and spend on vacations, 
but because most do not own property and collateral asset. Rather, most 
households are wage-earners who have not felt enough “wealth effect” to 
boost their consumption levels. Unless these concerns are effectively dealt 
with, consumers will not be spending their rainy day savings anytime soon. 
It also means that financial stimulus is a one-time shot designed to alleviate 
immediate problems in the economy by giving it a boost. More sustained 
growth must come less from government-backed capital infusion, but from 
balanced growth, including productivity growth. 
Between 2001 and 2007, Beijing maintained a fairly contractionary or 
tight monetary policy to control inflation and cool the asset-price bubbles 
(World Bank, 2008). However, once the contagion spread to China, the 
PBOC quickly adopted what it called a “moderately loose” (but in reality, a 
highly expansionary monetary policy) to support their highly expansionary 
fiscal policy. Specifically, beginning in the fourth-quarter of 2008, the 
central bank began to pump substantial volumes of liquidity into the banking 
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system, and the lending limits of commercial banks were scrapped in early 
November 2008 to provide even more loans. These easy-credit policies 
had predictable results – massive credit expansion. As Table 5 shows, 
broad money (M2) grew 28.4 per cent in the second quarter of 2009 – a 
significant increase over the end of 2008. Yu (2009: 10) notes that “in the 
first half of 2009, bank credit increased by 7.3 trillion RMB, which was 
above the official target for the full year… In contrast, the annual increases 
in bank credit in 2006 and 2007 were 3.18 trillion yuan and 3.63 trillion 
yuan respectively”.
In addition, to ease bank lending, the deposit reserve requirement ratio 
(RRR, which is the amount of bank reserves over the sum of deposits and 
notes) was lowered four times in 2008 – from 17.5 per cent to 14 per cent 
– giving banks more funds to lend. The central bank cut the benchmark 
interest rate on a five-year loan from 7.47 per cent in September 2008 to 5.31 
per cent in December 2008 – where it remained as to June 2010. In similar 
fashion, rates for mortgage loans were sharply reduced. Lardy (2010: 2) 
estimates that “the combined effect of a reduction in the benchmark five-year 
loan rate and the adjustment in the mortgage factor meant that the interest 
rate a potential home buyer would pay on a mortgage with a term of five 
or more years was reduced by two-fifths, from 6.66 to 4.16 per cent. This 
meant that the monthly payment on a 20-year mortgage was reduced by 18.6 
per cent. For property investors the 40 per cent minimum down payment on 
a mortgage, introduced in the fall of 2007, was scaled back to 20 per cent. 
And the compulsory penalty interest rate that applied to property investors, 
which had been set at 1.1 times the benchmark rate starting in September 
2007, was eliminated”. Not surprisingly, such an aggressive easing of credit 
led to a massive increase in bank lending – totaling some 30 per cent of GDP 
in 2009 (Figure 3).
Table 5 Monetary Indicators, 2008-2009
 2008 2009
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
M1 18.0 14.0 9.2 9.0 17.0 24.8 
M2 16.2 17.3 15.2 17.8 25.4 28.4
Bank Loans 14.8 14.1 14.5 18.8 29.8 34.4
Note:  M1 = money supply; M2 = M1 plus quasi money.
Source:  Vincelette et al., World Bank Study (2010: 16).
IJCS 3-2 combined text 31-08-12.128   128 8/31/2012   1:03:12 PM
Chinese Economy in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis      129
4. The Outcomes: Intended and the Unintended
China’s massive fiscal program, complemented by accommodative monetary 
policies and unprecedented bank lending played an essential role in helping 
the economy emerge from the crisis relatively quickly. A dynamic computable 
general equilibrium model developed by Diao, Zhang and Chen (2012) 
to assess the impact of the 4 trillion yuan stimulus package on China’s 
economic growth shows that GDP growth rate in 2009 could have fallen to 
2.9 per cent without the stimulus mainly as a result of the sharp decline in 
exports of manufactured goods. The revitalization of domestic demand not 
only helped GDP to recover by the second-quarter of 2009, but also boost 
intraregional trade. Yet, China’s credit expansion during 2009-10, was one of 
the highest in the world. Bank-financed investment has resulted in massive 
credit growth (some 9.95 trillion yuan in lending was granted in 2009 alone), 
carries inherent risks. 
China experienced this explosive bank financed credit boom, in large 
part, because of the peculiar nature of the country’s political institutional 
arrangements. For example, Beijing (the central government) financed only 
about 29 per cent (or 1.18 trillion yuan) of the stimulus by mainly issuing 
Figure 3 New Banking Lending
Note:  mma = monthly moving average, sa = seasonally adjusted.
Source:  Vincelette et al., World Bank Study (2010: 17).
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central government bonds. The bulk was financed by local governments 
borrowing from commercial banks, the corporate bond market and via local 
financing vehicles (LFVs). Created by local governments (by pooling public 
assets such as land into LFV and using it as a vehicle to raise capital), the 
LFVs were explicitly designed to circumvent the no-borrowing constraint 
imposed on local governments by Beijing in 2006. However, lacking the 
necessary checks and balances to ensure prudent borrowing, the LFVs have 
amassed huge debts (Shih, 2010). Moreover, although reforms in the banking 
sector have weakened the monopoly of state banks, and non-state banks 
have increased in both number and the range of services they offer, the “big 
four” state-owned commercial banks18 still dominate (Table 6), directing 
bulk of the credit to state owned enterprises at very low cost. In addition, the 
government also holds significant equity stakes in the remaining shareholding 
commercial banks, including the rural cooperative banks and credit societies 
(which are technically not state-owned). Beijing still maintains tight control 
over the banking sector, while regional banks are effectively controlled by 
local governments as they tend to be the major shareholders. Such pervasive 
state presence gives it tremendous clout, and predictably, bank lending still 
very much based on government directives rather than purely economic 
considerations.19
Moreover, like the central government, provincial/municipal and local 
governments can also raise funds via off-balance sheet vehicles such as the 
Table 6 China’s Banking Sector
 Total Assets in RMB  State Ownership
 (billions) (per cent)
Five Big Banks
1.  Industrial and Commercial  9,757.2  51
  Bank of China    
2.  China Construction Bank  7,555.5  48
3.  Agricultural Bank of China  7,100.0  100
4.  Bank of China 6,951.7  70
5.  Bank of Communications  268.3  26
Three Policy Banks
1.  China Development Bank  3,821.2  100
2.  Agricultural Development  1,354.7  100
  Bank of China     
3.  Export-Import Bank of China  566.7  100
Source: Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), Annual Report, 2008.
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credit-related wealth management products (CWMPs), credit-related trust 
products (CTPs), and as noted, via the newly allowed bond issuance backed by 
central government credit to finance stimulus and related spending programs. 
In fact, the central government clearly stipulated that only 1.18 trillion RMB 
(out of the 4 trillion RMB) of stimulus spending would be funded by Beijing. 
In other words, local governments had to fund the bulk of the spending. 
Local governments usually do this with Beijing’s backing – which instructs 
state-owned banks to provide loans “guaranteed” by local governments. This 
explains why state-run banks lend so generously and without delay and local 
governments borrow so generously and often. Yet, as we know from the 
2008 global crisis, placing loans off-the-books into off-balance sheet vehicles 
does not eliminate counterparty risk from the system. Rather, it just places it 
elsewhere – in this case, on the central government. 
As Yu (2009: 12) notes, this is, in part, because “local governments 
have an insatiable appetite for grandiose investment projects. Investment 
led by local governments is likely to lead to a sub-optimal allocation of 
resources”. In fact, in early 2012, the National Audit Office announced 
that “it had uncovered 531 billion yuan (US$83.8 billion) in irregularities 
involving local government debt, which amounted to 10.7 trillion yuan as of 
the end of 2010”.20 Similarly, as Naughton (2009: 280) points out, that “in 
order to move such a huge volume of credit, banks have inevitably turned to 
large, especially state-run companies to take up the loans. State firms enjoy 
implicit government guarantees for these loans… The result is that the share 
going to China’s private sector, already low, has dropped further. Loans to 
households for all purposes – consumption as well as household business 
– made up only 15 per cent of the increased lending in the first half of 2009, 
down from a 2007 peak of nearly one-third of all lending… The long-term 
objective of creating a more diverse and resilient economy, less dependent 
on large state-run firms, has been seriously set back”. Indeed, a number of 
analysts including Naughton (2009), Bremmer (2010) and Huang (2011) 
have noted that China’s stimulus program may have inadvertently served to 
further enhance the role of the state in the economy at the expense of the 
private sector. Hence, there are legitimate concerns about the commercial 
viability and soundness of many of these investments. If economic conditions 
deteriorate and these investments fail and put the repayment of the underlying 
debt in doubt, China will once again face the spectre of a sizable non-
performing loans problem in the banking sector, unsustainable asset-price 
inflation (especially, in real estate and equity markets), and excess capacity. 
Indeed, the IMF (2011) has correctly warned that such rapid and massive 
credit expansion also carries the real potential to distort and exacerbate the 
country’s already skewed growth patterns – that is further imbalance the 
growth pattern. 
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5. The Imperative of Rebalancing 
There are no guarantees that the normal business cycle can fundamentally 
rebalance China’s economy. During the Asian financial crisis, robust growth 
and demand in the advanced economies helped support Asia’s recovery. 
However, this time, the US, Japan, and Western Europe are in recession, if 
not difficult economic times, and their business confidence and consumption, 
on which China and other Asian countries (indeed, the world) depends are 
still reeling from massive deleveraging, crashing equity prices, and tight 
credit markets. The precipitous fall in asset prices (equity, bond, and housing 
markets) has dramatically eroded the net worth of households in the advanced 
economies. According to an IMF study “during the first three quarters of 
2008 alone, the value of household financial assets decreased by about 8 per 
cent in the United States and the United Kingdom, by close to 6 per cent in 
the euro area, and by 5 per cent in Japan. As global equity markets plunged 
in the last quarter of 2008, household financial wealth declined further – for 
example, by an additional 10 per cent in the United States. At the same time, 
the value of housing assets also deteriorated in line with falling house prices, 
especially in the United States and the United Kingdom”. More precisely, 
“the losses in household wealth during 2008 were about US$11 trillion in 
the United States (US$8.5 trillion in financial assets and US$2.5 trillion in 
housing assets) and were estimated at US$1.5 trillion in the United Kingdom 
(US$0.6 trillion in financial assets and US$0.9 trillion in housing assets)” 
(Brooks, 2009). Such unprecedented loss of household wealth coupled with 
growing financial liabilities in the advanced economies will inevitably force 
many households to deleverage their balance sheets and engage in more 
precautionary savings. This means that US consumers who have long served 
as the locomotive – not only for the US economy, but for the global economy 
– will not be able to serve in that role. In addition, as the government support 
for consumer spending winds down, it will further depress consumption. 
Table 7 illustrates that as consumers in the advanced economies abruptly 
cut back on spending in 2008 demand for exports sharply fall. Both sales of 
labour-intensive manufacturing products as well as higher value-added goods 
such as computers and related equipment and automobiles have fallen since 
September 2008 in all Asian countries for which data are available. 
If these current trends are any indication of the potential long term trends, 
export-dependent economies are at risk of a structural decline in demand 
from the advanced economies. In other words, not only the era of easy credit 
to finance consumer durables may be over, the over-leveraged households 
in the United States and elsewhere in the rich economies are saving more 
(Feldstein, 2008). If these “course corrections” hold, the export growth could 
be structurally lower and China’s (and Asia’s) export-led growth strategy 
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may no longer be as critical as in the past. If global demand for Chinese 
produced goods remains suppressed for the foreseeable future, China and the 
Asian region’s longer-term recovery will mean that its traditional reliance 
on export-promotion as the driver for growth will have to diminish.21 This 
means the need to rebalance growth away from exports and toward domestic 
demand in order to adjust to the structural shifts taking place in the global 
economy. Although, for export-dependent economies like China a boost in 
global demand is essential for recovery, domestic policy reorientation is also 
essential for long-term sustainability. As noted earlier, this could be partly 
achieved by building stronger social safety systems that reduces the need 
for precautionary savings to meet needs related to health, education, and 
retirement. Beijing, by effectively reducing imbalances can significantly aid 
in the recovery of the global economy, but also push the Chinese economy 
towards a more sustainable path. 
Over two years (2007-09), China’s current-account surplus (a broad 
measure of its international trade in goods and services) was reduced by 
Table 7 Collapse of Exports (Value, % Change)
 2007  2008  2009a
Country
 Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1
World  15.1  22.1  25.2  21.0  -9.5  -29.1
China 25.7  21.4  22.4  23.0  4.3  -19.7
India  21.5  37.6  37.1  25.5  -12.8  -24.1
Malaysia  2.7  9.9  20.8  16.8  -7.5  -22.2
Thailand  7.4  13.5  16.5  23.7 -9.7  -16.2
Philippines  6.4  2.8  5.5  4.1  -22.3  -39.9
Viet Nam  23.8  28.7  31.8  37.6  5.7  3.4
Cambodia  14.1  97.2  45.8  5.3  -3.3  —
Lao PDR  12.1  36.2  15.7  42.7  4.9 —
Bangladesh  11.1  17.5  8.6  19.3  12.5  10.6
Pakistan  2.9  20.9  25.9  19.0  1.7  -17.9
Sri Lanka  18.0  9.3  6.8  5.4  -3.5  -10.7
Notes: a First quarter figures are estimates using latest available data. Data for 
PRC are actual values.
   “—” indicates data not available.
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB 2009). Report to the Second Global 
Review on Aid for Trade: Aid for Trade in the Asia and the Pacific: An 
Update. June, Asian Development Bank: the Philippines, p. 3.
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half. By end of 2011, the current account surplus fell to 2.8 per cent of GDP 
from 10 per cent in 2007. Beijing also posted a US$31.5 billion trade deficit 
in February 2012. What explains this? Is it because China’s economy is 
rebalancing externally and domestic consumption is expanding? No doubt, 
there is some evidence that domestic demand is rising relative to exports – 
but to what extent is unclear. However, internal or domestic rebalancing 
remains static as China still has very low household consumption-to-GDP 
(about 30 per cent in 2011). According to the data compiled by the IMF (see 
Ahuja et al., 2012: 20), the decline in China’s external surplus is not “due to 
consumption rising as a share of GDP or national savings falling”. Rather, it is 
due to a combination of factors, including a much weaker global demand, very 
high levels of domestic investment, and a sharp increase in commodity prices 
relative to Chinese manufactured goods. Stated bluntly, the Chinese economy 
is still overly dependent on exports and large-scale infrastructure investment. 
Although, it is worth reiterating that Beijing has viewed rebalancing 
away from exports and investment and towards domestic consumption as a 
long-term goal, and in all fairness, such structural changes takes time, Beijing 
must make domestic rebalancing a top priority. Indeed, the crash of 2008, 
and the fact that China’s two largest export destinations (the United States 
and the Eurozone) are already in various stages of a massive deleveraging 
underscores that a growth strategy based on exports cannot be sustained 
indefinitely. It is in Beijing’s interest that it moves expeditiously towards 
rebalancing focused on domestic consumption immediately. Failure to do 
so could very well determine if China’s economic “landing” or whether 
its economy will slow gradually or decline abruptly and sharply after the 
stimulus-fueled growth of the past three years begins to run-out its course. Of 
course, an immediate action Beijing can take to facilitate rebalancing towards 
domestic consumption is to adopt a sustained policy of external rebalancing 
by allowing its undervalued currency to appreciate faster. As the next section 
argues, revaluation of the RMB to rebalance the US-China trade is essential 
for sustained global recovery.
6. Rebalancing Through Currency Reforms 
Since a close relationship exists between monetary policy and international 
trade, domestic monetary stimulus and central bank interventions in foreign 
exchange markets can help to boost exports. To this end, Beijing has regularly 
intervened in international exchange markets to prevent the RMB from 
appreciating relative to other currencies, particularly, the US dollar. Certainly, 
Beijing’s maintenance of an artificially low exchange rate is tantamount to 
erecting import tariffs and maintaining export subsidies – at least, as far as 
the trade account is concerned. In turn, this policy has enabled Beijing to 
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accumulate large global and bilateral trade surpluses. However, this strat-
egy has also angered Beijing’s trading partners, namely the United States, 
which has long claimed that Beijing deliberately “manipulates its currency” 
and engages in “mercantilist” practices to give itself an unfair advantage in 
global trade. 
It is useful to reiterate that to the United States, the origins and persis-
tence of its massive trade deficit with China is due to Beijing’s mercantilist 
economic policies (Tables 8 and 9). The US contention regarding China’s 
mercantile behavior is rather straight-forward: Beijing engages in gratuitously 
unfair trade practices via outright protectionism, and most perniciously, by 
deliberately manipulating its currency. Specifically, in maintaining an under-
valued exchange rate, Beijing has been able to dramatically increase its export 
growth and pile-up large current account surpluses – the latter by aggressively 
intervening in foreign exchange markets to keep its currency from appreci-
ating. This in turn has resulted in a massive build-up of foreign exchange 
reserves (Goldstein and Lardy, 2005). However, if Beijing allowed market-
forces to determine the value of its currency, its current account surpluses 
would be much lower and American trade balances much healthier.
Not surprisingly, American manufacturers with the backing of law-
makers in Congress have long argued that the artificially low yuan has 
placed American companies at a huge competitive disadvantage inter 
alia contributing to the bankruptcy of US companies and the loss of tens 
of thousands of American jobs.22 The contention is that the yuan is so 
Table 8 US Merchandise Trade with China, 1980-2007 (US$ billion)
Year  US Exports   US Imports  US Trade Balance
1980  3.8  1.1  2.7
1985  3.9  3.9  0
1990  4.8  15.2  -10.4
1995  11.7  45.6  -33.8
2000  16.3  100.1  -83.8
2001  19.2  102.3  -83.1
2002  22.1  125.2  -103.1
2003  28.4  152.4  -124.0
2004  34.7  196.7  -162.0
2005  41.8  243.5  -201.6
2006  55.2  287.8  -232.5
2007  65.2  321.5  -256.3
Source: US Congressional Research Service (2008: 2) in Morrison (2008).
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undervalued (by some accounts as much as 40 per cent) that it amounts to an 
unfair trade subsidy. This unfair advantage permits a flood of cheap Chinese-
made goods into the United States, but makes American products expensive in 
China.23 Thus, it is claimed that if the yuan was traded at its true market worth 
the bilateral imbalance between the two countries would be substantially 
reduced, if not altogether eliminated. This is because China’s exports to the 
United States would become more expensive in dollars and would therefore 
decrease, while China’s imports from the US would become less expensive 
in yuan and therefore increase. To make matters worse, China’s unwillingness 
to allow the yuan to appreciate has, in turn, made other Asian Pacific Rim 
countries reluctant to allow their currencies to appreciate because of their fear 
of losing further export sales to China.24 As US trade deficit with China soared 
to record level in first-quarter 2005, the Bush administration came under 
intense pressure to take unilateral action to address the problems associated 
with the artificial undervaluation of the yuan. US Treasury Secretary John 
Snow called for an immediate Chinese exchange rate adjustment, but many 
other lawmakers called for punitive tariffs on cheaply priced Chinese imports 
unless China sharply revalued its currency.
In May 2005, the US Senate by a margin of 67 to 33 voted to consider 
a proposal to impose a 27.5 per cent tariff on all imports from China unless 
Beijing stopped inflating its currency. In May 2005, the US decided to 
reimpose quotas on seven categories of clothing imports from China limiting 
their growth to no more than 7.5 per cent over a 12-month period. On 23rd 
June 2005, the Bush administration, which until then had insisted that 
diplomacy was working in getting China to allow the yuan’s value to be set 
by currency markets rather than controlled by the government, finally warned 
Table 9  US Merchandise Trade Balances with Major Trading Partners, 2007   
 (US$ billion)
Country/Trading Group  US Trade Balance
World  -791.0
China  -256.3
European Union (EU27)  -107.4
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) -127.4
Japan  -82.8
Canada  -64.7
Mexico  -74.3
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  -50.6
Source: US Congressional Research Service (2008: 2) in Morrison (2008).
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China that it could be cited as a “currency manipulator” and face economic 
sanctions unless it switched to a flexible exchange system. Labeling China’s 
currency policies “highly distortionary,” the Bush administration warned that 
it was going to closely monitor China’s progress towards adopting a flexible 
exchange system.
It seems that the unrelenting pressure worked. On 21st July 2005, 
Beijing made a big monetary shift in more than a decade by revaluing the 
yuan and dropping the currency’s peg to the US dollar by announcing that 
the yuan’s exchange rate would become “adjustable, based on market supply 
and demand with reference to exchange rate movements of currencies in 
a basket” composed of the dollar, the yen, the euro, among few other key 
currencies.25 This was an important, albeit modest shift. From 1994 to July 
2005 the value of the yuan was pegged to the US dollar at a rate determined 
by the People’s Bank of China. The yuan traded within the range of 8.27 to 
8.28 to the dollar because the People’s Bank maintained this peg by buying 
dollar-denominated assets in exchange for the yuan in order to reduce excess 
demand for the yuan. As a result, the exchange rate between the yuan and the 
dollar remained largely the same – despite changing market conditions. When 
Beijing abandoned the peg by moving to a system that now linked the yuan to 
a basket of currencies, it effectively raised the yuan’s value by 2.1 per cent.26 
This meant that prior to the revaluation US$1 bought 8.28 yuan, following 
revaluation US$1 would buy roughly 8.11 yuan. Beijing made it clear that it 
had set tight parameters on how much the yuan could rise. Clearly, the aim 
was to make sure that the yuan did not float by a big margin, but appreciate27 
by a modest 2 per cent by moving within a tight range of 0.3 per cent band 
against a group of foreign currencies which make up China’s top trading 
partners.28 Thus, unlike a true floating exchange rate, the yuan was allowed 
to fluctuate by only 0.3 per cent on a daily basis against the basket. However, 
this modest and gradual appreciation (called “managed float”) allowed China 
to continue to accumulate foreign reserves – implying that if the yuan was 
allowed to free float, it would appreciate much more rapidly – by some 
account by another 20 to 30 per cent. The fact that from July 2005 to June 
2008 the yuan appreciated by 14.4 per cent in terms of the US dollar (or from 
8.35 to 6.6 to the dollar), but much less in real effective terms (since most 
other major currencies have appreciated against the dollar) despite China’s 
large and growing trade surpluses, barely managed to placate the critics.
However, in July 2008, in the midst of a global financial meltdown 
Beijing resumed its earlier practice of pegging the RMB (or in other words, 
suspending its policy of allowing the yuan to strengthen), to revive its 
faltering export-dependent economy. From September 2008 to June 2010, 
Beijing kept the RMB stable against the dollar at 6.83 yuan to the dollar 
– in effect, preventing the renminbi from appreciating by putting in place a 
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de facto peg against the US dollar. However, during the height of the global 
recession the voices of the critics of China’s currency became muted, because 
among other things, the artificially low yuan allowed the United States (as 
well as other cash-strapped countries), to borrow large sums from China to 
stimulate their economies. In fact, rather ironically, Beijing’s currency and 
trade policy actually helped to stimulate the US, indeed, the global economy. 
Specifically, by purchasing US securities (in particular, Treasuries), Beijing 
was indirectly helping the United States to fund its massive budget deficits 
and skyrocketing debts. High demand from China not only boosts the value 
of fixed-income securities (and thereby, keeps US interest rates low), it also 
makes it much cheaper for Washington to borrow – and in the process keep 
its domestic mortgage and related consumer loan rates rather low. 
By 2010, with the global economy on the mend (but, job growth in 
advanced economies still stagnant), calls for China to let its currency float 
more freely grew again. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman (2010), who kept 
his powder-dry during the depth of the crisis, fired the first salvo when he 
scathingly noted that “China has become a major financial and trade power. 
But it doesn’t act like other big economies. Instead, it follows a mercantilist 
policy, keeping its trade surplus artificially high. And in today’s depressed 
world, that policy is, to put it bluntly, predatory”. According to Krugman’s 
“back-of-the-envelope” calculations, China’s weak-yuan policy cost 1.4 
million American manufacturing jobs. Of course, the US is not alone in its 
criticism. Beijing’s policy has also resulted in a large depreciation of the yuan 
against the euro – making it extremely hard for the beleaguered euro-zone 
countries to compete with Chinese exporters. 
On 3rd April 2010, the Obama administration announced that it would 
delay publication of the semiannual exchange rate report to Congress (due on 
April 15th), containing the international economic and exchange rate policies 
of America’s major trading partners. The report was eagerly awaited because 
it would officially state the Obama administration’s position on China’s 
exchange rate policy, in particular, whether Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner would declare China a “currency manipulator.” Instead, striking a 
measured tone, Geithner tactfully noted that “China’s inflexible exchange 
rate has made it difficult for other emerging market economies to let their 
currencies appreciate. A move by China to a more market-oriented exchange 
rate will make an essential contribution to global rebalancing”. Geithner 
noted that “the best avenue for advancing US interests at this time” is via 
discussions in multilateral and bilateral forums, including that of the G20 
finance ministers and central bank governors in late April; the semiannual 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue between the United States and China in 
May; and during the meeting of G20 leaders and finance ministers in June.29 
To further assuage Beijing, on April 7th, Geithner made an impromptu 
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75-minute stopover at the VIP terminal of Beijing airport (on his trip to 
India) to meet with Vice Premier Wang Qishan (China’s leading finance 
official) to “exchange views on US-China economic relations and the global 
economy”.30 
No doubt, the Treasury’s conciliatory message was intended to deescalate 
tensions that had been brewing for months between Beijing and Washington. 
In fact, the latest round of the war of words began during Geithner’s 
confirmation hearing (in January 2009), for Treasury Secretary when he 
bluntly stated that both he and “President Obama – backed by the conclusions 
of a broad range of economists – believe that China is manipulating its 
currency”.31 Geithner’s tough rhetoric brought nods of approval from the 
members of the Senate Finance Committee – many of who have long rallied 
against Beijing’s alleged malpractice and were now hoping for a firm stance 
against China from the new Obama administration. However, to the markets, 
Geithner’s tone signaled a potential confrontation between the world’s largest 
and second largest economy. The already jittery markets responded almost 
immediately as investors became concerned that China may scale-back its 
purchase of US debt if the new administration pushed Beijing to further 
revalue its currency: the dollar promptly fell, the price of gold jumped by 
US$40, and the price of Treasury debt was driven further down.32 Although 
Geithner tried to gloss over his remarks by stating that what he actually meant 
was for China to adopt “market exchange rates,” it only brought a short respite 
to this sensitive subject.
Rather abruptly, on 19th June 2010, Beijing relaxed its exchange-rate 
policy by making the yuan a bit more flexible. The People’s Bank ruled out 
any large one-time revaluations. Not surprisingly, by early August 2011, 
the yuan/dollar exchange rate was 6.44 – a modest appreciation. Clearly, it 
would be prudent for Beijing to adopt a much more flexible exchange rate. 
After all, China’s emphasis on exchange rate stability in the face of rising 
current account surpluses has not only generated intense protectionist pres-
sures in the United States and elsewhere, it has also forced the People’s Bank 
to accumulate massive foreign exchange reserves with negative domestic 
consequences. 
Specifically, by keeping the RMB from rising against the US dollar not 
only means that China’s central bank has to print more money to keep interest 
rates low, such a strategy can also exacerbate inflationary pressures if more 
money ends up chasing too few goods. It also means that China has fallen 
into a “dollar trap” – borrowing at higher cost and lending the money back to 
the United States for low to zero return. Because the bulk of these securities 
have been (and are) purchased when interest rates were (are) at historically 
low rates, means that these securities would lose value when rates eventually 
increases. It also means that Beijing is exposed to large capital losses on its 
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foreign reserve holdings (which are mostly held in US dollars) as the RMB 
appreciates. Inflation would further exacerbate this problem. Indeed, there 
is broad consensus that if the US Federal Reserve continues to print money 
(and thereby further debase the dollar) to pay down its debt, inflationary 
pressures would become a pervasive problem. This would mean that Beijing 
paid a “premium” for US securities, but will be paid back with dollars that 
are worth far less. Although, Beijing is now prudently moving more of its 
reserves into securities with shorter maturities (which are less vulnerable to 
rising interest rates and inflation), the fact is that the bulk of their reserves 
would lose value.
Rather, than locking such huge foreign currency reserves (the fruit of 
years of hard work and sacrifice by the Chinese people) in investments 
like Treasury securities (to arguably finance the consumption of ungrateful 
foreigners), Beijing would be better-off utilizing these resources to improve 
the living conditions of its people by investing in education, health care, 
housing, social security, and other human needs. Domestic exchange rate 
appreciation can greatly facilitate this as it will provide price incentives 
to shift resources toward production for domestic use and by raising real 
household income. Indeed, a meaningful appreciation of the exchange rate 
would immediately spur domestic consumption as it would give Chinese 
consumers real purchasing power – something China needs to expand and 
sustain. Finally, if Beijing’s oft-stated goal of making the RMB a global 
reserve currency (or even more modestly, increase the use of the RMB in 
international trade and finance), is to be realized, a meaningful loosening of 
foreign-exchange controls, especially in the capital account and allowing the 
RMB to be freely trade (in effect, revaluation), is essential. Of course, the 
US should be cautious regarding its wishes. After all, China could strengthen 
its currency by reducing its currency reserves. This would mean reducing 
or “unloading” its huge stockpile of US securities. This, in turn, would 
drive down the price of securities – thereby, sharply increasing interest rates 
– making it more costly for the United States to finance its deficit and debt, 
not to mention that the borrowing rates of American consumers could also 
see a sharp spike. 
7. Postscript
By early 2012, pressures for the yuan to appreciate eased substantially after 
China’s trade became more balanced – that is, the once huge trade surpluses 
have dwindled. In a surprise move, Beijing announced that effective 16th 
April 2012, the central bank would allow the yuan to rise or fall by 1 per 
cent instead of the previous limit of 0.5 per cent. Certainly, doubling the 
size of the yuan’s trading band against the dollar moved China a step away 
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from its investment and export-based growth model – albeit, such a timid 
step will hardly make consumption the key driver of growth anytime soon. 
Rather, pressure on the yuan to appreciate has been reduced as China’s 
trade surplus and capital inflows have shrunk with the yuan approaching 
a seemingly equilibrium level against the dollar.33 It is important to note 
that even as the central bank allows the market to play more of a role in the 
yuan’s daily movements, such a modest widening of the trading band will 
greatly limit how much the yuan can rise and fall from the official rate the 
central bank will set each day. Also, this does not mean that Beijing will 
necessarily allow faster appreciation of the yuan in the coming weeks or 
allow the yuan to eventually float freely.34 Indeed, in late May 2012, the 
renminbi dropped further against US dollar than in any other time since it 
was allowed to appreciate in 2005. Visibly upset, the Obama administration 
released a report two days later criticizing Beijing’s decision and demanding 
that the Chinese authorities release data on the scale of its foreign exchange 
market interventions (US Department of Treasury, 2012). Although, the report 
did not explicitly label China as a “currency manipulator,” Mitt Romney, 
the Republican presidential nominee, made it clear that if he was elected 
president, he would label China a currency manipulator on his first day in 
office. Clearly, unless Beijing fundamentally reforms its currency policy, the 
issue will remain a thorn in Sino-US relations. Of course, there is hope that 
China’s ambitious 12th Five Year Plan is committed (at least on paper) to 
dramatically rebalance the domestic economy by raising household income, 
expanding social services and boosting consumption. This is in the interest 
of both the Chinese and the global economy.
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1.   I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their 
thoughtful comments and Cass Krughoff and Li Li at the University of San 
Francisco for their very able research assistance. All remaining errors are 
mine.
2.   Akin and Kose (2007) argue that decoupling is part of the process of globaliza-
tion. Drawing on data from 106 countries (which they divide into developed, 
emerging and low-income), they measure how the correlation between econo-
mies has shifted over time even as cross-border flows have expanded. They find 
that even as growth has become more synchronized among the developed and 
emerging economies, over the past two decades, economic activity in emerging 
economies has decoupled from that of the developed economies. 
3.   Office of Management and Budget (2008), Mid-Session Review, Budget of the 
U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009, July 2008. <www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2009/pdf/09msr.pdf>
4.   At the end of 2010, China held an estimated US$2.85 trillion worth of foreign 
reserves. This is equivalent to 48 per cent of China’s 2010 GDP.
5.   Specifically, before the crisis broke, in an important speech, titled “The Global 
Saving Glut and the US Current Account Deficit”, Ben Bernanke, the Federal 
Reserve chair, offered a novel explanation for the rapid rise of the US trade 
deficit in recent years. To Bernanke, the source of the problem was not America, 
but Asia – especially China and the booming economies of East and Southeast 
Asia. He argued that if in the mid-1990s, these economies were significant 
importers of capital by borrowing abroad to finance their ambitious development, 
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, they made a sharp 
volte-face. Cognizant of the fact that absence of foreign hard currency reserves 
had made them vulnerable, they began to protect themselves (taking the IMF’s 
advice) against future crisis not only by amassing huge war chests of foreign 
assets. Amidst a global economic downturn, these savings now provided as a 
source of stability. 
6.   In fact, China did not experience a credit crunch.
7.   In 2007, China was the largest next exporter of capital – that is, some 21 per cent 
of all exported capital. IMF (2008c: 169)
8.   In 1998, the central government issued some 270 billion yuan of treasury bonds 
to recapitalize the large state banks, in addition to creating 4 asset management 
companies or “bad banks” for these banks to transfer their nonperforming loans 
(Ma, 2007).
9.   The RMB is also known as the yuan. Hence, the term RMB and the yuan are used 
interchangeably. 
10.  Beijing is also quite selective about FDI and only encourages foreign companies 
to invest in China using the so-called Greenfield FDI.
11.  The CSRC is the executive arm of the State Council Securities Committee which 
was established in 1992 to regulate China’s securities and futures market.
12.  That is, although overall the living standard of the masses has greatly improved 
it has not improved in line with the growth of China’s GDP.
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13.  Wen Jaibao, 2010, “Consolidate the upward momentum and promote sustained 
growth”, 13th September, available at <http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/en/NewsInfo.
asp?NewsId=25436>.
14.  According to the World Bank (2008b: 12), “during 2001-07, when growth was 
high and rising, fiscal policy was appropriately contractionary. In 2005, the 
fiscal policy stance was officially adjusted to ‘prudent’. In 2006 and 2007, fiscal 
contraction was particularly sizable”. 
15.  Office of Management and Budget (2008), Mid-Session Review, Budget of the 
US Government, Fiscal Year 2009, July 2008. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2009/pdf/09msr.pdf>
16.  China uses both the business tax (BT) and value added tax (VAT) in its turnover 
tax system. The VAT applies to the sale of goods and the BT is primarily levied 
on taxable services. Often, this leads to some industries to be double-taxed. In 
October 2011, Beijing announced that the VAT will eventually replace the BT, 
and Pilot Programs to this effect were launched on January 1st, 2012 for selected 
industries in Shanghai.
17.  Furthermore, the absence of sophisticated financial intermediation contributes 
to high level of savings. For example, private companies are forced to save a 
significant proportion of their earnings to finance future investment as access 
to bank lending can be unpredictable. Also, the relative lack of consumer credit 
fosters precautionary savings.
18.  China’s “big four” state-owned banks include, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC), 
and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). Geiger (2008) notes that the “Big 
Four” control some 80 per cent of the entire banking sector’s assets, have 
around 70 per cent of the total deposit and provide over 80 per cent of the total 
lending.
19.  This is a remarkable transformation from the one-time Soviet-style mono-bank 
system, under which the PBOC controlled almost four-fifths of all bank deposits 
and provided 93 per cent of all loans (Sharma, 1999).
20.  <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/01/31/china-debt-burden-safe-
sound-says-wen/> 
21.  China’s dependence on exports was vividly illustrated when in May 2009 
Beijing introduced a “buy Chinese clause” that discriminates against foreign 
businesses. 
22.  From its peak in early 1998, the United States has lost over 3.3 million 
manufacturing jobs. While not all of the job loss can be attributed to China, 
the US manufacturing sector, despite significant productivity growth could not 
overcome the huge trade advantage China gained by having an undervalued 
currency. The decline in manufacturing employment has led both Democratic and 
Republican senators to threaten the Chinese with substantial tariffs on Chinese 
imports to offset the Chinese currency advantage. For details, see Hufbauer and 
Wong (2004). 
23.  Some economists claim that the yuan is anywhere from 15 per cent to 40 per 
cent undervalued against the dollar, making Chinese exports to the United 
States cheaper and contributing to China’s trade surplus with the United States. 
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Of course, no one really knows the true extent of the under-valuation. This is 
because in not letting the market decide a currency’s value means the nominal 
exchange rate – literally the number of units of one currency you can get for one 
unit of another – is essentially made up. It is whatever the government chooses 
it to be, so long as the regime can be feasibly maintained. For a good overview, 
see Keidel (2011); Lardy (2005); Subramanian (2010a); and Makin (2007). For 
a dissenting view, see Lin, Dinh and Im (2010). 
24.  Indeed, following the Chinese revaluation, Malaysia responded by shifting its 
own currency regime from a dollar peg to a basket peg. However, given the very 
small initial change in the yuan’s value, most countries in the region seems to be 
waiting for a more substantial yuan revaluation before taking action.
25.  Revaluation is the resetting of the fixed value of a currency at a higher level
26.  Both flexible and floating exchange rates have distinct advantages – albeit, no 
single exchange rate regime is appropriate for all countries in all circumstances. 
A fixed exchange rate which pegs the value of a currency to a stronger foreign 
currency like the US dollar or the euro has advantages for developing countries 
seeking to build confidence in their economic policies. On the other hand, coun-
tries with fixed exchange rates are seemingly more vulnerable to currency crises. 
As economies mature and become more closely aligned with the international 
financial markets, exchange rate flexibility seems more advantageous. 
27.  When a currency increases in value, it experiences appreciation. When it falls 
in value and is worth fewer US dollars, it undergoes depreciation. Thus, when 
a country’s currency appreciates (rises in value relative to other currencies), 
the country’s goods abroad become more expensive and foreign goods in that 
country becomes cheaper. Conversely, when a country’s currency depreciates, its 
goods abroad become cheaper and foreign goods in that country become more 
expensive.
28.  Both the central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan and Premier Wen Jiabao 
noted that the revaluation should be viewed as the first in what is expected to 
be a series of steps over years to shift the yuan toward even greater flexibility 
as China increases its participation in the world trading system. See, People’s 
Bank of China (2005), “Public Announcement of the People’s Bank of China on 
Reforming the RMB Exchange Rate Regime”, July 21st. <http://www.pbc.gov.
cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=82>
29.  “Statement of Treasury Secretary Geithner on the Report to Congress on Inter-
national Economic and Exchange Rate Policies”, April 3, 2010, United States 
Department of the Treasury, No. TG-627. <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
tg627.htm>
30.  Bill Powell (2010), “Why Geithner Made A Surprise Stop in Beijing”, Times, 
April 8th <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1978666,00.html?xid= 
rss-fullworld-yahoo>; and Keith Bradsher (2010), “China Seems Set to Loosen 
Hold on Its Currency”, April 8th, The New York Times. <http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/04/09/business/global/09yuan.html?ref=business&src=me&pagewan
ted=print>
31.  In his written statement to the Senate panel, Geithner noted then senator Obama’s 
support for “tough legislation to overhaul the US process for determining currency 
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manipulation and authorizing new enforcement measures so countries like 
China cannot continue to get a free pass for undermining fair trade principles”. 
However, the Obama administration quickly backtracked from Geithner’s 
statement and declined to label China a “currency manipulator.” Rather, the 
administration noted that while it still believes that the yuan is undervalued, it 
also recognizes that China has taken steps to rebalance its economy and enhance 
exchange-rate flexibility. See, Lori Montgomery and Anthony Faiola (2009), 
“Geithner Says China Manipulates Its Currency,” The Washington Post, January 
23rd, p. A08. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/22/
AR2009012203796.html> Also, “Statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner on Release of Semi-Annual Report to US Congress on International 
Economic and Exchange Rate Policies”, April 15th, 2009. <http://www.treas.
gov/press/releases.tg90.htm>
32.  Treasury securities (or Treasuries) are the debt financing instruments of the US 
government. There are four types of marketable treasury securities: Treasury 
bills, Treasury notes, Treasury bonds, and Treasury Inflation Protected Securities 
(TIPS).
33. As noted, China’s current account surplus dropped sharply from about 10 per 
cent of GDP in 2007 to around 2.8 per cent in 2011. A surplus between 2.5 and 4 
per cent of GDP is widely seen as when a currency has reached its fair value or 
“equilibrium”.
34. This is because the daily trading band limits intraday fluctuations, and the central 
bank is not constrained on how it sets the daily official exchange rate.
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